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Abstract— In recent years, wireless sensor network becomes 
popular both in civil and military jobs. However, security is one 
of the significant challenges for sensor network because of their 
deployment in open and unprotected environment. As 
cryptographic mechanism is not enough to protect sensor 
network from external attacks, intrusion detection system (IDS) 
needs to be introduced. In this paper we propose a policy based 
IDS for hierarchical architecture that fits the current demands 
and restrictions of wireless ad hoc sensor network. In this 
proposed IDS architecture we followed clustering mechanism to 
build four level hierarchical network which enhance network 
scalability to large geographical area and use both anomaly and 
misuse detection techniques for intrusion detection that 
concentrates on power saving of sensor nodes by distributing the 
responsibility of intrusion detection among different layers. We 
also introduce a policy based intrusion response system for 
hierarchical architecture.  
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor networks (WSN) are becoming the target 
point of many scientific researches. Among the technical 
constraints small size, limited mobility and lifetime, low 
battery power, storage, memory, computational power are 
distinguished. Such networks need to be more secured than 
others, as sensor nodes are more vulnerable due to operation 
in hostile environment. So, a number of cryptographic, 
communication and physical security mechanisms are 
proposed to fight against the vulnerabilities. Though some of 
the IDSs are proposed in the field of sensor networks but they 
are not complete in a way to build IDS and are applicable 
only in small geographical area. In this paper we address this 
problem and contribute by proposing a novel architecture for 
intrusion detection scheme of WSN. 
II. EXISTING CHALLENGES IN IDS ARCHITECTURE
Existing IDS architectures are not adequate to protect 
WSN from all kinds of inside and outside attackers. None of 
them are complete. Most of the existing IDSs deal with wired 
architecture except their wireless counterpart. Though a 
number of IDS architectures are proposed for ad hoc network, 
the architecture of WSN is even more sophisticated than 
wireless ad hoc network. An ideal IDS has the capability of 
detecting inside and outside attacks, known and unknown 
attacks with low false alarm rate. Existing IDS architectures 
that are specifically designed for sensor networks are 
suffering from lack of scalability and resources e.g. 
processing power, storage capabilities, unlimited battery 
backup etc.   
III. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH
There are few IDSs that are proposed for Wireless Ad hoc 
network to protect these threats. Most of them work on 
distributed environment which means they work on 
individual nodes independently and try to detect intrusion by 
studying abnormalities in their neighbours’ behaviour. Thus 
they require the nodes to consume more of their processing 
power, battery backup, and storage space which turn IDS to 
be more expensive, or become infeasible for most of the 
applications. Some of the IDS use mobile agents in 
distributed environment. Mobile Agent supports sensor 
mobility, intelligent routing of intrusion data throughout the 
network, eliminating network dependency of specific nodes. 
But this mechanism still is not popular for IDS due to mobile 
agents’ architectural inherited security vulnerability and 
heavy weight. Almost all the IDS are attack-specific which 
make them concentrated to some specific type of attacks. 
Some of them use centralized framework which make IDS 
capable exploiting a personal computers high processing 
power, huge storage capabilities and unlimited battery. On 
the other hand most of them work in decentralized fashion. 
Most of the IDS are targeted to routing layer only, but it can 
be enhanced to detect different types of attacks at other 
networking layers as well. Most of the architectures are based 
on anomaly detection which examines the statistical analysis 
of activities of nodes for detection. Some detects only 
intrusion while some do more like acquiring more 
information e.g. type of attacks, locations of the intruder etc. 
Though a number of IDS mechanisms are proposed Wireless 
ad hoc network but very few of them can be applicable for 
WSN because of their resource constrains. Self-Organized 
Criticality & Stochastic Learning based IDS [1], IDS for 
clustering based sensor Networks [2], A non-cooperative 
game approach [3], Decentralized IDS [4] are distinguished 
among them. Existing IDSs designed for WSN have lack of 
resources e.g. high processing power, high storage and 
battery backup etc. IDS scalability is another limitation for 
WSN which highly correlates with application environment, 
network management tool, available resource etc. We studied 
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all the weaknesses and strong part identified of intrusion 
detection systems architecture to evaluate a new system.
Finally, based on all the attacks and their detection system a 
new detection and response system is proposed which use 
policy based architecture that might overcome the 
weaknesses of the current IDS. 
IV. POLICY BASED IDS ARCHITECTURE
A policy implies predefined action pattern that is repeated 
by an entity whenever certain conditions occur. The 
architectural components of policy framework include: a 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point 
(PDP), and a Policy repository. The policy rules stored in 
Policy repository are used by PEP to implement rules or to 
show results. PDP translates the available data to a device-
dependent format and configures the relevant PEPs. The PEP 
executes the logical entities that are decided by PDP [6]. 
Hierarchical WSN management can be realized by policy 
mechanism to achieve both scalability and autonomy in 
Intrusion detection in large geographical area. Survivability is 
one of the major achievements, intended from the proposed 
system, can be ensured by policy mechanism. So, in case of 
failure the system enables one component to take over the 
management role of another component. To achieve a policy-
based management for IDS the proposed architecture has 
several components that evaluate policies: a Base Policy 
Decision Point (BPDP), a number of Policy Decision 
Modules (PDM). 
Base Policy Decision Point (BPDP) 
The BPDP is the controlling component of the architecture. It 
implements policies or intrusion rules created by the Intrusion 
Detection Tool (IDT) by receiving events, evaluating 
anomaly conditions and applying new rules, algorithms, 
threshold values etc.
Policy Decision Modules (PDM)
Policy Decision Modules are components that perform 
implementing sophisticated algorithms in relevant domains.
Hierarchical network management that is proposed in this 
paper uses intermediate nodes (e.g. Regional nodes, cluster 
nodes) to distribute the detection tasks. Each intermediate 
node has its own agent called Regional or Cluster agent 
which collects and processes information from its domain and 
passes the required information to the upper layer nodes for 
further steps. All the intermediate nodes are also responsible 
to distribute command/data/message from the BPDP to lower 
layer agents. There is no direct communication between the 
member nodes.  
The hierarchical architecture of policy management for 
WSN is shown in figure 1. It comprises of several 
hierarchical layers containing Intrusion Detection Agent 
(IDA) at each layer. Each layer represents to particular 
network scopes and is protected by agents affiliated to that 
layer. As shown in figure 1, four levels of hierarchical agents 
from base station to sensor nodes. They are Base Policy 
Decision Point (BPDP), Regional Policy Agent( RPA), Local 
Policy Agent (LPA), Sensor Node(S). 
                   BPDP: Base Policy Decision Point 
                          RPA: Regional Policy Agent 
                          LPA: Local Policy Agent 
                          S: Sensor Node 
Figure 1: Hierarchical Architecture of IDS Policy Management 
A.  Structure of Intrusion Detection Agent (IDA) 
An IDA as shown in figure 2 consists of the following 
components: Pre-processor, Signature Processor, Anomaly 
processor and Post processor. The functionalities are 
described as follows: 
1)  Pre-Processor 
It either collects the network traffic of the leaf level sensor 
when it acts as an LPA or it receives reports from lower layer 
IDA. Collected sensor traffic data is then abstracted to a set 
of variables called stimulus vector to make the network status 
understandable to the higher layer processor of the agent. 
2)  Signature Processor 
 It maintains a reference model or database called 
Signature Record of the typical known unauthorized 
malicious threats and high risk activities and compares the 
reports from the pre-processor against the known attack 
signatures. If match is not found then misuse intrusion is 
supposed to be detected and signature processor passes the 
relevant data to the next higher layer for further processing. 
3)  Anomaly Processor 
It analyses the vector from the pre-processor to detect 
anomaly in network traffic. Usually statistical method or 
artificial intelligence is used in order to detect this kind of 
attack. Profile of normal activity which is propagated from 
Base station is stored in the database. If the activities arrived 
from pre-processor deviates from the normal profile in a 
statistically significant way, or exceeds some particular 
threshold value, attacks are noticed. Intrusion detection rules 
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are basically policies which define the standard of access 
mechanism and uses of sensor nodes. Here database acts as a 
Policy Information Base (PIB) or policy repository.  
4)  Post Processor 
It prepares and sends reports for the higher layer agent or 
base station. It can be used to display the agent status through 
a user interface. 
                  Figure 2: Intrusion Detection Agent Structure 
B. Hierarchical policy management 
Except the leaf level sensor nodes all the nodes in the 
higher level are configured with higher energy and storage. 
LPA manages the sensor nodes which is more powerful than 
traditional sensor nodes. LPAs perform local policy-
controlled configuration, filtering, monitoring, and reporting 
which reduces management bandwidth and computational 
overhead from leaf level sensor nodes to improve network 
performance and intrusion detection efficiency. An RPA can 
manage multiple LPAs. In the same way BPDP manages and 
controls all the RPAs. If we compare it to architectural 
components of policy framework then BPDP is equivalent to 
global PDP, RPA stands for intermediate PDP, and an LPA 
resembles PEP. These three level Policy management agents 
manage the low level sensor nodes in WSN. Policies are 
disseminated from the BPDP to Sensor Nodes through RPA 
and LPA as they are propagated from PDP to PEP in policy 
framework.  
Policy agents described above helps the network to be 
reconfigured automatically to deal with fault and 
performance degradation according to intrusion response. 
One of the major architectural advantages of hierarchical 
structure is any node can take over the functionality of 
another node dynamically to ensure survivability. A flexible 
agent structure ensures dynamic insertion of new 
management functionality [6]. Proposed IDA structure 
ensures dynamic insertion of new rules for IDS. Dynamic 
update of different hierarchical agents help signature based 
anomaly detection effectively. So if Base station can detect 
any anomaly as attack it will disseminate the signature of 
attack to the LPA through RPA. Signature of attacks actually 
resembles Policy Repository of policy based architecture. 
When Network administrator wants to execute some 
Intrusion Detection Algorithm, BPDP sends the relevant 
policy to all the intermediate agents. In this design no 
intrusion detection modules are stored in leaf level Sensor 
nodes in order to preserve their valuable resources. On the 
other hand each intermediate agent is kept on standby mode 
which improves the real-time performance effectively. 
V. INTRUSION DETECTION ENTITIES 
In this architecture, total area of sensor network will be 
divided into several regions (e.g. GSM cells) [11]. Sensor 
nodes in each region are monitored by a cluster node. Two or 
more cluster nodes will be monitored by a regional node. In 
turn, Regional nodes will be controlled and monitored by the 
Base station. Figure 3 shows an example of the model. It is 
noted that each region is not necessarily bound to be strictly 
hexagonal.   
Figure 3: Intrusion detection entities 
Sensor Nodes have two functionality: Sensing and 
Routing. Each of the sensor nodes will sense the environment 
and exchange data in between sensor nodes and cluster node. 
As sensor nodes have much resource constraints, in this 
model, there is no IDS module installed in the leaf level 
sensor nodes.  
 Cluster Node plays as a monitor node for the sensor nodes 
where LPA works. One cluster node is assigned for each of 
the small region e.g. GSM cell. It will receive data from 
sensor nodes, analyses and aggregates information to send to 
the regional node. It is more powerful than sensor nodes and 
has intrusion detection capability built into it.  
Regional Node will monitor and receive the data from 
neighbouring cluster heads where RPA works. It sends the 
combined alarm to the upper layer base station. It is also a 
monitor node with all IDS functionalities. If thousands of 
sensor nodes are placed at the leaf level then whole area will 
be split into several regions to make the sensor network more 
scalable and more manageable. 
Base Station is the topmost part of architecture empowered 
with human support. BPDP works here. It will receive 
information from Regional nodes and distribute the 
information to the users on demand.  
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VI. INTRUSION RESPONSE 
There are differences between intrusion detection and 
intrusion prevention. If a system has intrusion prevention, it 
is assumed that intrusion detection is built in. IDSs are 
designed to welcome intrusion to get into system; where as 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) actually attempts to 
prevent access to the system from the very beginning. IPS 
operates similar to IDS with one critical difference: “IPS can 
block the attack itself; while an IDS sits outside the line of 
traffic and observes, an IPS sits directly in line of network 
traffic. Any traffic the IPS identifies as malicious is prevented 
from entering the network [7].” So in case of IDS “Intrusion 
Response” should be the right title for recovery. 
There are two different approaches for intrusion response: 
Hot response or Policy based response [8].  Hot response
reacts by launching local action on the target machine to end 
process, or on the target network component to block traffic. 
E.g. kill any process, Reset connection etc. It does not 
prevent the occurrence of the attack in future. On the other 
hand, Policy based response works on more general scope. It 
considers the threats reported in the alert, constraints and 
objectives of the network. It modifies or creates new rules in 
the policy repository to prevent an attack in the future. In case 
of reaction approaches countermeasure could have negative 
impact on the network. For example, an administrator might 
not prefer to react, as the risk of the detected attack is less 
than the risk resulting from triggering off a candidate 
countermeasure [10]. So a risk assessment method is needed 
to evaluate and justify the risk of an attack and its 
countermeasure. In our proposed IDS, we allow policy based 
response system. Base station’s Policy decision point and 
other policy decision modules take part in the response 
mechanism together. Intrusion can be detected either in 
Cluster node or Regional node. Finally, base station can be 
involved anytime if network administrator wants to upgrade 
signature database or policy stored in intermediate agent. 
Intrusions are detected automatically according to the policy 
implemented by BPDP. Re-action is also automatic but 
administrator may re-design the architecture according to 
special requirement.  
In [9] a novel intrusion detection and response system is 
implemented. We have applied their idea in our response 
mechanism with some modification. Our IDS system 
considers each sensor nodes into one of five classes: Fresh,
Member, Unstable, Suspect or Malicious. We have Local 
Policy Agent, Regional Policy Agent and finally Base Policy 
Decision Point to take decision about the sensor node’s class 
placement. Routeguard mechanism use Pathrating algorithm 
to keep any node within these five classes [9].  In our model, 
we have policy or rules defined in Base station’s BPDP to 
select any node to be within these five classes as shown in 
figure 4. When a new node is arrived, it will be classified as 
Fresh. For a pre-selected period of time this new node will be 
in Fresh state. By this time LPA will check whether this node 
is misbehaving or not. After pre-defined time it will enter into 
Member state automatically if no misbehave is detected. 
Otherwise the node’s classification will be changed to 
Suspect state. In Member state nodes are allowed to create, 
send, receive or forward packets. In this time Member nodes 
are monitored by Watchdog at LPA in Cluster node. If the 
node misbehaves, its state will be changed to Unstable for 
short span of time. During Unstable state nodes will be kept 
under close observation of LPA. If it behaves well then it will 
be transferred to Member state again. A node in Unstable 
state will be converted to Suspect state in two cases: Either 
the node was in Unstable state and interchanged its state 
between Member and Unstable state for a particular times 
(threshold value defined in LPA) within a predefined period,
or the node was misbehaving for long time (threshold value). 
LPA’s Post processor sends “red alert” to RPA whenever 
Suspect node is encountered. Then the suspected node will be 
completely isolated from the network. It will not be allowed 
to send, receive, or forward packets and will be banned 
temporarily for short time. Any packets received from 
suspected node are simply discarded.  After a certain period 
of time the node will be reconnected and monitored closely 
for extensive period of time by three layer agents. If 
watchdogs report well then node status will be changed to 
Unstable. However, if it continues misbehaving then it will 
be labelled as Malicious and banned permanently from the 
network. To ensure that this malicious node will never try to 
reconnect, its MAC address or any unique ID will be added to 
Signature Record Database of LPA and all other higher layer 
agents. 
´
Figure 4: Operation of Intrusion Response 
Survivability is one of the major factors that are predicted 
from every system. We consider base stations to be failure 
free. But the Regional nodes or cluster nodes may be 
unreachable due to failure or battery exhaustion. So, in case 
of failures or any physical damage of Regional nodes or 
Cluster nodes, control of that node should be taken over by 
another stable node. So in our proposed architecture if any 
Regional node fails, then its control will be shifted to the 
neighbour Regional node dynamically. 
So, control of the Cluster nodes and sensor nodes 
belonging to that Regional node will be shifted automatically 
to the neighbour node. In the same way if any cluster node 
fails then control of that cluster node will be transferred to the 
neighbour Cluster node.    
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So, if any LPA is unreachable due to failure or battery 
exhaustion of cluster nodes, neighbour LPA will take the 
charges of leaf level sensor nodes which was in the area of 
fault cluster node. In the same way due to Regional nodes’ 
failure neighbour Regional node’s RPA will take over the 
functionality of all the cluster node’s LPA and sensor nodes 
belonged to the faulty Regional node dynamically. 
Figure 5 : Regional  node’s failure 
As we mentioned, Cluster nodes or regional nodes have no 
direct communications between them. So how will Cluster 
node or Regional node determine about the failure of its 
neighbour? Actually in the proposed architecture Base station 
has direct or indirect connections with all its leaf nodes. Base 
station has direct connection with Regional node. So if any 
Regional node fails Base station can identify the problem and 
select one of its neighbour nodes dynamically according to 
some predefined rule in BPDP. Then BPDP needs to supply 
the policy, rules, or signatures database to the selected new 
neighbour Regional node. In the same way if any cluster node 
fails then policy, rules or signatures of the failed cluster node 
will be supplied by the BPDP through relevant RPA. As Base 
station is much more powerful node with large storage; all the 
signature databases, anomaly detection rules or policies are 
stored primarily as backup in Base station. This back up 
system increases reliability of the whole network system.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Proposed IDS system is highly extensible, in that as new 
attack or attack pattern are identified, new detection 
algorithm can be incorporated to policy. Possible venues for 
future works include: 
 Present model can be extended by exploring the secure 
communication between base station, Regional node 
and cluster node. 
 Implementation of Risk Assessment System in the 
manager stations to improve the reaction capability of 
IDS.  
 We actually focus on the general idea of architectural 
design for IDS and how a policy management system 
can be aggregated to the system. But an extensive work 
needs to be done to define Detection and Response 
policy as well. 
 Overall, more comprehensive research is needed to 
measure the current efficiency of IDS, in terms of 
resources and policy, so that improvements of its future 
version(s) are possible. 
 Building our own Simulator: all the previous research 
were based on three layer architecture, so we are 
planning to create our own simulator that will simulate 
our four layer policy based architecture. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel architecture of IDS for 
ad hoc sensor network based on hierarchical overlay design. 
We propose a response mechanism also according to 
proposed architecture. Our design of IDS improves on other 
related designs in the way it distributes the total task of 
detecting intrusion. Our model decouples the total work of 
intrusion detection into a four level hierarchy which results in 
a highly energy saving structure.  
Policy based mechanism is a powerful approach to 
automating network management. The management system 
for intrusion detection and response system described in this 
paper shows that a well structured reduction in management 
traffic can be achievable by policy management. This policy-
based architecture upgrades adaptability and re-
configurability of network management system which has a 
good practical research value for large geographically 
distributed network environment.  
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